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Huxley coined the phrase, the “evolutionary synthesis” to refer to the acceptance by a 
vast majority of biologists in the mid-20th Century of a “synthetic” view of evolution. 
According to this view, natural selection acting on minor hereditary variation was the 
primary cause of both adaptive change within populations and major changes, such as 
speciation and the evolution of higher taxa, such as families and genera.  This was, 
roughly, a synthesis of Mendelian genetics and Darwinian evolutionary theory; it was a 
demonstration that prior barriers to understanding between various subdisciplines in the 
life sciences could be removed.  The relevance of different domains in biology to one 
another was established under a common research program.  The evolutionary synthesis 
may be broken down into two periods, the “early” synthesis from 1918 through 1932, and 
what is more often called the “modern synthesis” from 1936-1947.  The authors most 
commonly associated with the early synthesis are J.B.S. Haldane, R.A. Fisher, and S. 
Wright.  These three figures authored a number of important synthetic advances; first, 
they demonstrated the compatibility of a Mendelian, particulate theory of inheritance 
with the results of Biometry, a study of the correlations of measures of traits between 
relatives.  Second, they developed the theoretical framework for evolutionary biology, 
classical population genetics.  This is a family of mathematical models representing 
evolution as change in genotype frequencies, from one generation to the next, as a 
product of selection, mutation, migration, and drift, or chance.  Third, there was a broader 
synthesis of population genetics with cytology (cell biology), genetics, and biochemistry, 
as well as both empirical and mathematical demonstrations to the effect that very small 
selective forces acting over a relatively long time were able to generate substantial 
evolutionary change, a novel and surprising result to many skeptics of Darwinian 
gradualist views.  The later “modern” synthesis is most often identified with the work of 
Mayr, Dobzhansky and Simpson.  There was a major institutional change in biology at 
this stage, insofar as different subdisciplines formerly housed in different departments, 
and with different methodologies were united under the same institutional umbrella of 
“evolutionary biology.”  Mayr played an important role as a community architect, in 
founding the Society for the Study of Evolution, and the journal Evolution, which drew 




1. The Background to the Synthesis 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was not uncommon for biologists to claim 
that “Darwinism is dead.”  By this was meant, not that Darwin’s hypothesis of common 
descent was discredited, but rather that Darwin’s preferred mechanism, selection, was 
neither the exclusive nor main cause of either adaptive differentiation or species forming.  
In Kellogg’s Darwinism Today, he claimed that “Darwinism… as the all-sufficient or 
even most important causo-mechanical factor in species forming and hence as the 
sufficient explanation of descent, is discredited and cast down.” (Kellogg, 1907).  
There were a number of competing theories on offer apart from Darwin’s preferred 
selective explanation.  More popular mechanisms for evolution were a variety of neo-
Lamarckian theories, Orthogenesis (or inherent tendency toward “progress,” understood 
as greater complexity of organization), and various saltationist or “mutationist” schools 
(where evolution proceeded by major mutations).  Neo-Lamarckians accepted “soft” 
forms of inheritance, or direct influence of the environment on traits passed to offspring, 
also called the inheritance of acquired characters.  DeVries, Johannsen and other 
“mutationists” argued exclusively for “hard inheritance,” and argued on behalf of the 
view that mutation, not selection, was the engine of evolution. 
 This “eclipse of Darwinism” as it’s been called (Huxley, 1942, Bowler, 1983), 
was, however, gradually reversed in the years of 1918-1930.  A number of population 
geneticists demonstrated that the Mendelian, or “mutationist” theory, as it was then 
known, was compatible with a gradualist, Darwinian, and selective explanation of 
adaptive differentiation.  This period has been called the early synthesis. 
 
2. Early Synthesis:  1918-1932 
 
The early synthesis may be broken down into three stages.  First, there was a 
reconciliation of Biometry and Mendelism. Second, there was the development of a 
mathematical theory of evolution, classical population genetics, which delimited the 
major causal factors shaping populations over time.  Third, there was a broader synthesis 
of population genetics, classical genetics, chromosomal mechanics, biochemistry, and 
cytology, in Haldane’s (1932) Causes of Evolution.  In this book, and earlier (1924), 
Haldane demonstrated the sufficiency of natural selection for both observed 
microevolutionary and significant macroevolutionary change.  For some biologists, these 
texts served as a definitive answer to claims to the effect that “Darwinism is dead,” by 
ruling out the necessity of appeal to mechanisms other than selection (such as 
Lamarckian or orthogenetic forces).  However, for many biologists (“naturalists” such as 
systematists (those who classify species), the mathematical representations of evolution 
were too difficult to interpret, and thus unpersuasive.  Another ten or fifteen years passed 
before these ideas were effectively communicated to a broader biological audience. 
The conflict between the Mendelian and Biometrical schools took place roughly from 
1900-1918, largely in the UK.  The divide was over whether gradual selection on 
“quantitative” or continuously varying traits, was sufficient for the transformation of 
species and higher taxa.  For instance, can slight variations in such things as leg length or 
girth  be added up in such a way that new species can be created, or whole new phyla?  
On the one hand, Weldon, Pearson, Mendola, and Poulton argued that evolution was 
largely a gradual process.  On the other hand, Bateson, DeVries, and Johannsen argued 
that major mutations were the driving force of evolution; evolution proceeded by “macro-
mutations.” Members of both groups were concerned with the nature of inheritance.  
Biometricians took a descriptive, statistical approach, measuring phenotypic variation 
and relations of these measurements within and between parent and offspring 
populations.  This data was used to found investigations into the role of natural selection 
in shaping the distribution of continuous traits in populations from one generation to the 
next.  Weldon, for instance, was one of the first biologists to conduct statistical inquiry 
into a case of selection in the wild.   
After the rediscovery of Mendel’s 1865 paper in 1900, Bateson, DeVries, and others 
claimed Mendel as their predecessor, and thus came to be called the “Mendelian” school. 
DeVries claimed to have found evidence that evolution proceeded via selection on major 
mutations, or “discontinuous” variation.  The Mendelians posited a particulate theory of 
inheritance; they held that variation was of two sorts, “fluctuating” and “discontinuous,” 
and that it was the latter that was important to evolution.  Evolution must ultimately rely 
on mutation as the source of new variation, where by mutation they meant new genetic 
factors that caused genuinely novel characters, or major morphological shifts.   
The first stage of the early synthesis was a resolution of a conflict between these two 
schools of thought.  Fisher’s 1918 paper, “On the Correlation Between Relatives on the 
Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance,” demonstrates how a multifactorial theory of 
inheritance can serve to underpin observed correlations between relatives discovered 
through biometrical methods.  While Fisher’s demonstration has some of the 
characteristics of a reduction – one that involved a number of simplifications – it 
nonetheless failed to convince many biologists, for at least another ten years, of the 
compatibility of a Darwinian, gradualist view of evolution, and a Mendelian, particulate 
theory of inheritance. 
  The second stage of the synthesis built upon this early synthesis.  Haldane, Fisher 
and Wright represented evolution as change in genotype frequency in a population from 
one generation to the next.  At this stage, roughly from 1922-1930, this family of models 
effectively served as a “how possibly” demonstration of how a Darwinian view of 
evolution could be modeled mathematically, assuming a particulate theory of inheritance.  
These authors placed emphases on different factors – selection, mutation, migration, and, 
what was at first called “inbreeding effect,” now known as random genetic drift (or, the 
notion that chance factors, such as the random sampling of alleles due to meiosis and 
recombination from one generation to the next could change the distribution of allele 
frequencies).  In addition to demonstrating not only how it was possible for evolution to 
proceed along these lines, these three authors also engaged in empirical work, attempting 
to test various theories concerning the effects of selection in the wild, for instance, in the 
evolution of dominance.   
More importantly, at least for many skeptics of Darwinism at this point, was 
Haldane’s demonstration that a very small selection coefficient over a relatively short 
amount of ‘geological time,’ might effect vast changes in populations.  An empirical case 
study of the same was the case of Biston betularia, the famous peppered moth population 
in Manchester, which, over a relatively small amount of time changed their distribution 
of the “carbonaria” gene – or, from a primarily white phenotype to a dusky color, due (it 
was then argued) to predation of white moths on polluted trees (Haldane, 1924).  (The 
pollution leads to death of light coloured lichens, thereby exposing the darker bark.)  This 
case of industrial melanism was one of several studies of both artificial selection, in the 
lab, in agricultural contexts, and selection in the wild in the 1910s through the 30s (Castle 
and Philips, 1914; Sturtevant, 1918; Payne, 1920; Sturtevant and Dobzhansky, 1938).  
The accumulated evidence for gradual selection on Mendelian traits, however, took some 
time to find their way into mainstream evolutionary biology.   
 
3. The Modern Synthesis: 1932-1942 
 
The modern synthesis of the 1930’s and 40’s did not consist in the development of a 
new theory of evolution, nor did it consist in a unification or reduction of two previously 
distinct theories.  Rather, this later synthesis had two components, a “negative” as well as 
“positive.”  The “negative” component was a removal of misunderstandings between 
different fields in biology about the major causes of evolution, and the “positive” 
component was the advance of a new research program (Mayr and Provine, 1980).   
Coincidentally, there was a substantial institutional change in biology at this time.  
Indeed, in order to understand the character of the synthesis, it is important to describe 
some institutional features of biological study prior to the 1930’s and 40’s.  The study of 
evolution was not a recognized discipline; rather, there were zoologists, botanists, 
paleontologists, systematists, cytologists, embryologists, and (at that time, a relatively 
new field), geneticists.  Participants in these different fields were divided on questions 
about scientific methodology, and on substantive issues about major patterns and 
processes of evolutionary change.  One of the great advances of the synthesis was that 
these separate fields of investigation came into communication, sharing evidence, 
methods, and theoretical frameworks, as well as a forming of consensus concerning the 
major mechanisms of evolution.  
What was required for such consensus building were “bridge builders” – not only in 
the sense of those willing to learn new fields of biology and entertain novel views, but 
individuals willing to organize conferences, journals, and institutional settings where 
experts in these initially distinct fields could communicate (See Cain, 1993). One such 
bridge builder was Ernst Mayr, who, along with Dobzhansky, Simpson, and Huxley, 
published a series of books in the 1930’s and 40’s with broadly “synthetic” themes 
(Mayr, 1942; Dozhansky,1937; Simpson, 1944; Huxley, 1942) .  These books surveyed 
their respective fields (systematics, genetics, speciation, paleontology) and argued that 
the observations of these diverse fields were compatible with the new science of genetics, 
according to which heredity was particulate and broadly Mendelian.  Moreover, all these 
books argued for a Darwinian view of evolution, according to which microevolution, or 
change within populations, was not distinct in kind, but only in degree from 
macroevolution.  The genetic differences within species were the same as those between 
species; and, given sufficient time and the appropriate conditions, selection could yield 
genuine evolutionary novelty.  Over the course of ten years, from the 1930s to the 1940s, 
selection was gradually accepted as the major if not exclusive cause of evolution (see, 
Gould, 1983).  Thus, the synthesis was effectively a “constriction” of mechanisms – 
appeal to neo-Lamarckian and orthogenetic causes was no longer regarded as necessary 
or appropriate.  Further, Mayr, along with collaborators such as Dobzhansky, Jepsen and 
Simpson, organized the Society for the Study of Evolution, founded the journal, 
Evolution.  
What enabled this synthetic view?  There were several components.  First, the 
theoretical framework was put in place by population geneticists in the 1920s and 30s.  In 
addition, there was cytological and experimental work that strongly supported a 
Mendelian view of genetics, as well as the effectiveness of selection in experimental and 
wild populations.  Sutton and Bovari advanced the chromosomal theory of inheritance, 
Morgan and Muller did important work on patterns of inheritance using Drosophila, 
experimental work by Castle, East, Dobzhansky, Wright, and others on selection in the 
laboratory, and, Jordon’s, Grinnell’s, and Mayr’s extensive surveys of biogeography and 
work on speciation demonstrated that geographical isolation played an important rule in 
speciation.  Finally, Simpson’s (1944) survey of the paleontological literature 
demonstrated a consistency with a range of Darwinian genetics models. 
In addition to these empirical advances, there was a bridging of “divide” between 
experimentalists and naturalists.  Some (Mayr, 1980, Allen, 1979) have argued that the 
most substantial divide between biologists in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries was 
that between proponents of a “descriptive,” “classificationist” and “naturalist” approach 
and an “analytic,” “experimental” approach.  Allen (1979) documented the different 
fields of expertise, training, views on mechanisms of inheritance and genetics of a wide 
variety of biologists at the turn of the century and confirmed this divide.  On the one 
hand, those in the “new” experimental fields of genetics, experimental embryology, 
physiology, or cytology, for instance, tended to be strong Mendelians, and skeptical of 
gradualist, Darwinian views.  On the other hand, those trained in geology, paleontology, 
systematics, zoology or botany, were largely skeptical of or indifferent to Mendelian 
genetics, and were more likely to be pro-Darwinian, or Lamarckians.  Allen discusses 
how naturalists and experimentalists disagreed, not only on questions of how to do 
science, but also on the question of whether Mendelian genetics was relevant to, in 
opposition to, or consistent with a Darwinian view of evolution.  It took roughly 30 years 
for biologists to become convinced that the isolated, experimental conditions under which 
the principles of genetics were discovered and studied, could be relevant to evolutionary 





4. Philosophical Issues: Unification, Reduction, Synthesis, or “Constriction”? 
 
The import and character of the modern synthesis has been controversial (see 
Smokovites, 1996).  Nonetheless, a unification of sorts was accomplished in the sense 
that participants in the synthesis agreed on a number of substantive and methodological 
issues.  First, neo-Lamarckian, orthogenetic and mutationist forces of evolution were no 
longer considered important factors in evolution.  Second, the Mendelian, particulate 
view was established as the exclusive model of inheritance.  Third, one could represent 
the major factors of evolution – selection, mutation, migration, and drift – in a suite of 
mathematical models.  Fourth, micro- and macro-evolution were viewed as continuous, 
rather than distinct kinds of evolutionary change, requiring radically different 
mechanisms or explanatory resources.   Finally, there was consensus that the methods 
and aims of the different fields of biology – zoology, botany, genetics, systematics, 
paleontology, etc. – were not in tension, but could be reconciled, and that evidence from 
these disparate fields could be shared with the common aim of understanding the pattern 
and process of evolution.  Granting all these claims, there are many open questions about 
what sort of “synthesis” the modern synthesis was, how it was distinct from other kinds 
of scientific change, and whether the synthesis underwent a “hardening” or constriction, 
which left out significant advances, in particular, in developmental biology. 
Was the synthesis a “reduction” or “unification” in philosophers’ senses of the terms?  
There are stages of the synthesis that approximate but still fall short of these notions.  
Fisher’s (1918) demonstration of the compatibility of biometric correlations with 
particulate inheritance was, while not a reduction of one theory to another in the most 
restrictive sense of a deductive derivation from sets of laws and bridging principles, a 
reduction in the most permissive possible sense (Sarkar, 1998).  Fisher made a number of 
idealizing assumptions that departed from Mendelism (e.g. no dominance), which 
permitted the correlations discovered by biometers to be derived from a particulate model 
of inheritance. 
Also, the development of theoretical population genetics in the early period was 
unifying in that it provided a mathematical model, and thus explanatory framework, for 
how evolution was possible on a Mendelian theory of inheritance.   Such a framework 
permitted the development of quantitative tests of evolutionary change in the laboratory 
and field.  This account is captured to some extent by Glymour’s (1980) account of 
unification, according to which unified theories demonstrate how diverse phenomena are 
of a kind or exhibit a common pattern.  Likewise, Morrison (2000) argues that unified 
theories “embody a mathematical structure or mathematization of the phenomena that 
furnishes an abstract, general framework capable of unifying diverse phenomena under a 
single theory.”  These characterizations capture some aspect of what was accomplished in 
the early synthesis.  For, Fisher, Haldane and Wright did demonstrate how diverse 
phenomena are of a kind, and the same patterns of inference and argument would be used 
to predict evolutionary change using these models.   
The later synthesis (1936-1947) was, however, not so much a unification in the 
classical sense of reduction, as a removal of barriers to understanding and a reconciliation 
of views and sharing of evidence across previously distinct fields of study.  The synthetic 
theory is better understood as the advance of a Darwinian research program, one that 
involved thinking about data in new terms, developing a new vocabulary, and sharing of 
methods and evidence.  Shapere (1980) has argued along these lines that the modern 
synthesis was more in the way of developing a policy or creed than a theory.  He 
compares the synthesis to Oersted’s experiment relating electricity and magnetism, and 
Sutton’s demonstration of a correlation between Mendelian genes, and cytological data 
concerning chromosomes.  Both demonstrations provided a strong reason for thinking 
that a unified explanation of the two domains could be expected.  In other words, the 
evolutionary synthesis had more of the character of a demonstration of what is possible 
and likely, than the notion of a “deductive,” or “logical” syntheses, where facts to be 
explained could be deduced from a set of laws and principles. 
One issue that has persisted as controversial concerns what the synthesis “left out”; in 
particular, some have argued that innovations in developmental biology and embryology 
were not incorporated into the synthesis (Waddington, 1957).  Further, Gould (1986) has 
argued that over the course of approximately 10 years (1930’s- 40’s) a neo-Darwinian 
view came to predominate in the synthesis, according to which adaptation became the 
central problem of evolutionary studies, and cumulative, gradual selection on minor, 
mutations the exclusive cause and adequate explanation of the diversity of life.  There is 
no doubt that there is some truth to both claims.  However, there is some explanation for 
this.  First, as Hamburger (1980) has pointed out, the synthesis of genetics and 
development was in its early stages in the early 20th Century.  Genetics was a relatively 
new field, and very little was known about the relationship between genetics and 
development; or, at least, there were very few biologists at the time with familiarity with 
both evolutionary theory generally and developmental genetics in particular.  Thus, the 
process of development was more or less treated as a “black box” for most evolutionists 
participating in the synthesis.  Though, Huxley (1942), who himself did research in 
embryology and one of the most popular authors of the synthesis, referred to 
developmental biology and embryology as contributing to the synthesis, he did not 
discuss how at much length.  As Hamburger asserts “it has always been a legitimate and 
sound research strategy to relegate to a “black box,” at least temporarily, wide areas that 
although pertinent would distract from the main thrust.  No great discoveries or 
conceptual advances are made without this expediency.”(Hamburger, in Provine and 
Mayr, 1980, pp. 99-100)  In other words, at this stage, what first required reconciliation 
were the new science of genetics and the broad sweep of evolutionary change over time.  
Only recently has a new synthesis of evolutionary developmental biology and genetics 
been possible (Raff, 1996).   
5. The Synthesis and Biology Today 
Is the synthetic view representative of what biologists today view as the central 
commitments of their field?  Biologists today would agree with many of the tenets of the 
synthesis described above.  First, they would agree that neo-Lamarckian, orthogenetic 
and mutationist forces of evolution are not factors in evolution.  Second, the Mendelian 
model of inheritance is still central to genetics, though of course it has been vastly 
elaborated upon with modern quantitative genetics, molecular biology, and genomics.  
Third, population genetics is still used today to address a variety of questions about 
microevolutionary change.  Though, of course, these models have been advanced upon.    
With advances in molecular biology, population geneticists now understand far more 
about the nature of genetic variation and its history.  Population genetic theory is both 
“backward” and “forward-looking.”  While early population genetics theory concerned 
itself only with immediate future generations, today, using coalescent theory,  biologists 
can determine the time to most recent common ancestor of distantly related species.    
Fourth, while many biologists would agree that micro- and macro-evolution are not 
distinct kinds of evolutionary change, there are some who would forcefully disagree.  
Gould (2002) and others have championed the view that explaining major transitions in 
evolution requires different explanatory resources than those available in traditional 
microevolutionary theory.  That is, changes over vast stretches of evolutionary time may 
exhibit unique patterns, and be subject to processes at higher levels of organization than 
mutation, migration, drift, and natural selection between individuals.  Fifth, that evidence 
from different fields of biology can be shared with the common aim of understanding the 
pattern and process of evolution is certainly not in question; indeed, there have been even 
greater cross-disciplinary advances in the last fifty years.  Molecular biologists, 
systematists, population geneticists, developmental biologists, and ecologists, all draw 
upon one anothers’ work with the shared aim of understanding the patterns and processes 
of evolutionary change. 
Admittedly, the synthesis has been subject to some “bashing” by biologists on a 
variety of grounds.  First, Lewontin and Gould (1979) famously criticized what they took 
to be the “adaptationist” bent inherited from the authors of the latter synthesis.  In their 
view, the “hardening” of the synthesis led biologists to too frequently assume that each 
and every trait could be “atomized” and understood as a product of selection.  They 
unhesitatingly ruled out the role of developmental constraints and chance factors in 
evolution.  In this same vein, some biologists argue that a “new synthesis” of 
evolutionary theory with developmental biology is ongoing.  “Evo-Devo” acknowledges 
the role(s) of development in shaping the tree of life, as well as the vast importance of 
plasticity in development to evolution (West-Eberhard, 2003).  Finally, the rapid 
advances in genetics and molecular biology in the past 25 years in particular has 
dramatically changed not only the conceptual, but also the institutional character of 
biology since the synthesis.  More funding is available into research in molecular 
biology, and with the genomes and related projects, ever more funding supplied to work 
with potential medical applications.  Much more funding goes into molecular biology 
than field work.  Thus, (and rightly so), many biologists bemoan the loss of the 
“naturalist” – ecologists, systematists, and field biologists who can identify species in the 
wild and do their main experimental work in the field, and not merely the laboratory.  
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